Changing Trends of Transnational Terrorism in Kenya

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Abstract
Aims and Objectives: The aim of the study was to analyze the changing trends in transnational terrorism in Kenya. The objectives were to: assess the conceptualization of terrorism among the security agents; investigate the motives of the perpetrators of transnational terrorism; examine the factors that aggravate transnational terrorism; assess the current threat of transnational terrorism; and evaluate the effectiveness and or ineffectiveness of the different counterterrorism strategies in Kenya.
Methodology: Historical research design was applied where both qualitative and quantitative approaches were used in data collection and data analysis.
Results: Conceptualization of terrorism was found to have occurred over time with change in motives and targets of the terrorists. Currently, respondents were found to perceive terrorism as unlawful acts intended to accomplish different goals through violence intended to intimidate the civilians. However, they acknowledged that there are variations in what is considered as terrorism in different contexts. It was also revealed that there has been a shift in motives and factors aggravating terrorism. Religious ideologies and economic factors are currently the major drivers of people to engage in terrorism. The threat of transnational terrorism was found to have increased over time been affirmed to be still relatively high in the country. Use of intelligence gathering and sharing as well as the use of special forces was asserted as the most effective counter-terrorism strategies in the country at present.
Conclusion: The study concludes that the change in motives and targets of terroristshas resultedinto current definition and conceptualization of terrorism to be very biased and subjective. It is also concluded that use of intelligence gathering and sharing and use of special forces are currently the most effective strategies in curbing terrorism.
Keywords: Transnational terrorism, Counterterrorism, Violent extremism, Radicalisation

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I. INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is among the major security issues in the current international political order. It has persistently remained a threat to global security as evidenced by a series of continuous terrorist attacks worldwide.In Kenya and the East African (EA) region in particular, the threat of transnational terrorism is largely associated by the activities of Al-Shabaab a group affiliated to the Al-qaeda. Its base is believed to be Somalia, a country which since 1991 with the collapse of Siad Barre, continues to be ungovernable and ungoverned. Just like countering violent extremist acts is complex, so is the very definition of terrorism itself. Depending on the motive, location and time of one's conceptualization of terrorism,many acts have been labeled terrorism and its perpetrators terrorists. This paper takes Enders and Sandler (2012) definition noting that terrorism comprises predetermined use or intimidation to use violence by persons or sub-national groups to intimidate more people than the immediate noncombatant victims, so as to achieve a certain social or political motive. Our discussion thus sees terrorism from two broad perspectives; categories; domestic and transnational terrorism. The former is homegrown and occurs within a country's jurisdiction. The orchestrators, target and the venue are all from the same nation. Transnational terrorism (TT) on the other hand involves terrorists transiting an international border to perpetrate and or engage in an attack (Enders, Sandler &Gaibulloev, 2011). The impacts of terrorism and related activities are grave. They impact a nation's economy by among others, deterring and derailing growth, destruction of social fabric, death and destruction of property. Generally human security is threatened. Countering terrorism has thus become not only a national but a global goal.

States individually or collectively have developed various strategies aimed at curbing transnational terrorism. Some of these strategies include inter alia, the use of diplomatic power, economic and financial power, information, law enforcement and military power. Each of these strategies is faulted for one reason or the other. For instance, the United Nations (UN) has made efforts to develop legal and normative means to fight TT, yet differing perceptions on terrorism threats among member states' undermine the efforts (Chumba, Okoth

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& Were, 2016). Rosand (2006) highlight that actions taken independent of the UN such as the Financial Action Task Force, the Proliferation Security Initiative among others, are quite promising but most of them are voluntary and not legally binding. Failure to comply and enforce existing frameworks as well as inadequate resources and poor expertise are also major setbacks (Chenoweth, 2013). Effectiveness of diplomacy is also undermined by inefficient regional and institutional structures and unclear foreign policy objectives and poor coordination (Kwesi, 2012). Intelligence gathering and sharing is also identified as one of the largely adopted strategies in many countries (Martin, 2016). However, it is also undermined by lack of co-operation amongst the various agents involved as well as the tendency among different agencies to withhold "their" information being reluctant to share it (Catano&Gauger, 2017).

Kenya in particular is a member of various initiatives designed to enhance the fight against TT in the EA region including the East African Regional Strategic Initiative (EARSI) and the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) (Ploch, 2010); the Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program by the US Department of State (Aronson, 2013); as well as the counterterrorism efforts by IGAD (Rosand et al., 2009) among others. These and other efforts have been lauded. Their efforts in countering especially threats and attacks from the infamous Al-shabaab have in particular seen decreased cases of terror attacks. However, terrorism still remains a major security challenge in the country. This article appraises existing strategies, in particular efforts at intelligence gathering and sharing and their effectiveness in dealing with transnational terrorism in Kenya. The paper concludes by suggesting possible ways of effectively and efficiently tackling violent extremism in the context of globalization.

II.   MATERIAL AND METHODS

Study Design
Historical research design was used in this study. The design was chosen due to its strong ability to address the study problem through an in-depth analysis of issues overtime. We chronologically documented the various facets of terrorism in Kenya noting that it has changed overtime. To achieve this, we employed both qualitative and quantitative techniques for data collection and analysis.

Study Location
The research wasconveniently conducted in Kenya. Kenya being a major economic hub in East Africa and geo-politically situated in the middle of her conflict prone neigbours, it has remained a major target for transnational terrorism. With increased refugee influx terrorists have found it easy to camp and unleash untold fear and suffering to its citizen. Geographically, Nairobi, Mombasa and parts of Northeastern areas were sampled for the study.

Study Duration
The study was conducted over a period of two years fromOctober 2017 toSeptember 2019.

Sample population
The study sample was drawn from security officers, members of civil society dealing with security, government officers, the Kenyan public and refugee populations living in urban areas and academicians. By the time saturation levels were achieved we had 123 informants for the study.

Sample Size Calculation
Data for this study was largely qualitative and as such saturation was our best bet. In total through purposive and snowballing techniques, out of the 150 targeted people a return rate of 123 was recorded.

Subjects and Selection Method
Our criteria for inclusion was; those most affected by terrorism and terror threats, key security officers within various arms of government, civil society organizations, religious leaders, members of the public and academicians. Key Informant interviews were conducted from two categories; Senior security officers and local NyumbaKumi leaders drawn from Nairobi, Mombasa and Mandera.   Some community leaders, academicians, local community mobilisers and leaders members of civil society organisations were selected and formed into focus groups for in-depth discussions. All the informants were selected based on their knowledge of the subject matter.

Procedure Methodology
After getting the permit to conduct the study from all relevant authorities, an open-ended questionnaire and a question guide were developed and used to collect data. Due to the high secrecy often involved in the issues of security and most importantly terrorism, convenience sampling came in handy and referrals worked for the study. The researcher on the ground always created good rapport with informants and informed them on the purpose of the research.

Statistical Analysis

Mixed analysis method was used in this study. The mixed analyses method was preferred because the study involved the use of both qualitative and quantitative data. Quantitative data was analyzed through descriptive statistics of percentages, means, standard deviations and frequencies.Qualitative data was analyzed through content analysis by systematically classifying it and extracting the themes or trends, and interpreting them in line with the study objectives.

III. RESULTS

Nomenclature on Terrorism

With the changes experienced in the nature, motives and targets of what has been considered as terror attacks, terrorism has been categorized differently overtime. Traditionally,it has often been categorized into state and non-state terrorism. State terrorism is where the regime in power in given country controls the citizenry by using terror. On the other hand, non-state terrorism is orchestrated by sub-groups within a given state seeking to accomplish a particular motive through terror (Grothaus, 2018). Grothaus (2018) demonstrates that non-state terrorism has been further split into different categories including among others:

Religious terrorism: This is mainly orchestrated by groups that seek to further religious ideologies.

Right wing terrorism: This is characterized by militias who fight liberal governments to preserve traditional social orders and are often racially motivated hence seek to marginalize minorities.

Left wing terrorism: In this type of terrorism, the motive is mainly to overthrow capitalist democracies and replace them with socialist or communist governments. This was common during the cold war era.

Separatist terrorism: The motive in this type of terrorism is to fragment a country and establish a new state and is often orchestrated by the minorities within a state who perceive they are being discriminated from the majority.

With time however, terrorism shifted from individual states problem to an international problem especially after the 9/11 terror attacks. To this end there has been a shift in categorization of terrorism where recently, scholars like Enders, Sandler andGaibulloev(2011)have categorized it into domestic and transnational terrorism. The former is homegrown where orchestrators, target and the venue are all from the same nation. On the other hand, transnational terrorism (TT) involves terrorists transiting an international border to perpetrate the attack (Enders, Sandler &Gaibulloev, 2011).

Nevertheless, despite the paradigm shifts in terrorism, a consensus is yet to be reached on the definition of terrorism. Terrorism as a concept has remained both complex and fluid. Its conceptualization is dependent on who, where, why and when it is given. For this research informants gave diverse definitions. Interestingly though, a kind of consensus emerged when generally, informants noted that terrorism comprises any of the unlawful use of violence to threaten civilians. A security officer, for instance defined it as;

...an act of using violence, aggression, and threat as a way of achieving a goal that may be social, political or economical.

A worker with a civil society institution in Mandera added that;

It is unlawful use of violence and intimidation against civilians and institutions with the view of instilling fear and personal gains. It however depends on the countries affected.

The definitions tend to reflect some aspects contained in definitions that have been put forward by some scholars. For instance, according to Enders and Sandler (2012), terrorism refers to predetermined use or intimidation to use violence by persons or sub-national groups to intimidate more people than the immediate noncombatant victims, so as to achieve a certain social or political motive. Grimland, Apter and Kerkhof (2006) broadly construe it as irregular usage of violence directed to civilians to achieve a political motive. Therefore, terrorism can be defined as the totality of unlawful violent acts done by a person or group of persons primarily to intimidate civilians as a means to accomplish social, political or economic goals.

The officers further indicated that there is a nexus between transnational crime and transnational terrorism. According to a senior security officer in Nairobi,*'..although with distinctly different conduct in their activities and their aims, there are areas that give rise to their mutual cooperation.'* Another senior security officer in Mombasa elaborated that

Groups in transnational crimes form alliances with transnational terrorists. For instance, they form alliances to perpetuate crimes such as money laundering, bomb-making and weapon smuggling.

This was seconded by an academician who asserted that there is a connection between the two '*…because of the involvement of human trafficking and money laundering activities involved for transnational terrorism to succeed.'*In more general terms, a senior security officer in Mombasa explained the relationship as follows:

Transnational crime and transnational terrorism share similar characteristics, tactics and techniques in three parts: shared methods, transforming one group to the other over time, and long term and short term transaction between the groups.

This is an indication of criminal networking between groups in transnational crimes and groups in transnational terrorism especially in financing the criminal activities and moving of weapons from one place to the other.This liaison between transnational terrorism and transnational crimes has been blamed for increment in insecurity in different areas. The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) for instance highlighted that the networks between transnational crimes and terrorism is responsible for the security crisis in the Sahel region (UNODC, 2013). The findings therefore indicates the existence of criminal networking between groups in transnational crimes and groups in transnational terrorism especially in financing the criminal activities and moving of weapons from one place to the other which is likely to worsen the insecurity threat posed by transnational terrorism in the country.

Motives and Factors Aggravating Transnational Terrorism
According to Nasser-Eddine et al (2011), terrorism has evolved with changes in motives being experienced overtime. They explain that,it all began in the rise of liberation ideologies for democracy including those that were being advocated for through early social movements like the French revolution, nationalism and Marxism. A major shift in motives further developed in the twentieth century when state terrorism came into the limelight with the Russian revolution and violent state dictatorship of Hitler, Stalin and Mussolini regimes. Duyvesteyn (2007) adds that the anti-colonial movements also marked a major stage in the evolution of terrorism. These would later evolve into the contemporary global terrorism largely characterized by fundamentalism and fanaticism perceived to emanate from Muslim dominated countries. Botha (2013) traces the development of this contemporary terrorism to the rise of Iranian revolution and Afghan-Soviet conflict of 1978. According to Aronson (2013),no one reason can be conclusively attributed to people who join terror groups.Apparently therefore, reasons for engagement in terrorism are context specific and bound to vary with difference in perception among different people. To this end, this study explored the perceptions on motives behind engagement of terrorism.


Figure 1: Perception on the motives of perpetrators of transnational terrorism

While security officers find religious motives as the single most reason for engagement in terror crimes, youth in Mandera, Nairobi and Mombasa asserted that poverty is the major reason for the radicalization and joining terror groups. A youth in Nairobi for instance asserted that:
When we as the youth have no jobs and the cost of living is so high here, most of us end up pursuing any means available to come out of poverty including terrorism as long as it earns money.
This was affirmed byMukinda (2015) who highlighted under-development and poverty as major factors contributing to engagement in terrorism, noting that youth are often lured to join extremist groups purely on assurance of money, shelter and food by the terrorist groups. This according to Devine (2017) is further complicated by youth unemployment and lack of economic opportunities that makes it easy to lure the youth into the terrorist groups. The implication therefore is that where poverty is high and youth unemployment is high too, it is very easy for terrorism to proliferate.

In total however,(60%) of the respondents in this study saw religion as the driving force while (36.4%) attributed increased recruitment into terrorist groups to economic factors. Probed further, religious leaders in Mandera, however noted that religion is just a conduit yet the real motive for engagement in terror groups is unemployment. An Immam in Mandera had this to say;
Terrorists try to use religious separation where they have extreme belief that their group is superior and anyone who don't lay allegiance to it is an enemy and should face the full wrath of their god without mercy.But while they do this they always promise youth a job.
As concluded by a local NyumbaKumi leader based in Mombasa religious extremism is just a scheme that terrorists manipulate to lure unemployed youth.He explained that

This ideology in Kenya is not popular because Kenyans refused this separative aspect and profiling based on religion, but terrorists have been trying hard to use it but have not succeeded in any way. It is only in countable cases but not popular.

Affirming the role of religious factors in engagement in terrorism, Devine (2011) highlights religious motives as a major factor too indicating that this occurs where religion is powered by increased quantitative membership driven by a quest for the furtherance of an extremist religious ideology as opposed to positive spiritual transformation. The implication is that any religious grouping whose agenda is any social or cultural goal without the primary intent of positive spiritual transformation can easily mutate into terrorism.

While religious and economic factors appear to be the most prevalent factors promoting engagement into terrorism, other social factors as affirmed by 14.5% of the total respondents also brings about engagement into terrorism.Peer pressure and media influence were common themes in the other social factors highlighted. For instance, a youth in Mombasa expressed that;

Sometimes it all comes with peer pressure where your friends will push you into joining them on the basis of what they consider as gain or discrimination and if you don't have your stands, you will easily fall into it.

This was reflected by Botha (2014) who indicated that several Muslim youth in Kenya were influenced to join terror groups to express their dissatisfaction with the government's perceived discriminatory law enforcement policy that they considered as punishing their religious leaders. Emphasizing this, Graff (2010) asserted that perceived discrimination in law enforcement especially in weak state structures is among the reasons for engagement in terrorism especially in failed states majority of which are underdeveloped countries. This implies that where grievances of discrimination by the state against a particular sub-group are prevalent, terrorism can easily be furthered within the sub-group.

A youth from Mandera further explained that;

Sometimes, youth are easily deceived by what they read in the media. They absorb false information propagated through the social media which negatively influences their perspectives against the government and as a result they end up joining terrorists to fight the government.

The concern about the media influence has also been highlighted by Devine (2017) who explained that with the growing accessibility to voluminous information and ideas through the internet, fake news and prejudiced reporting that have no objectivity end up misleading vulnerable groups. As a result, they end up being radicalized into positions of intolerance eventually turning into terrorism. It is no surprise that terrorist groups are currently venturing into the use of social media to spread propaganda and recruit the youth into terrorism.

Current Threat of Transnational Terrorism in Kenya

According to Nasser-Eddineet al (2011), the threat of transnational terrorism globally has generally increased in the present age compared to the past due to several reasons including: terrorists' having greater access to more lethal weapons than in the past; growth in information communication technology making easier for terrorist to coordinate and expand their networks at present than in the past, among others. This increasing trend was also reflected in the Global Terrorism Index report 2017 which indicated that with an exception of North America, terrorism has been increasing in all the world regions since2002 (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2017). However, different countries have indicated varying trends over the years. In Kenya, the first terrorist attack occurred in 1976 targeting an Israel aircraft (*El Al*) but was thwarted through effective coordination between Kenya and Israel (Mogire& Agade, 2011). Since then, several TT attacks have been executed in the country. This study interrogated the perception on the trend in the threat of transnational terrorism in the country.

Table 1: Perception on the current threat of transnational terrorism

Duration in national security service	Percent (%)					Mean	Std. Dev.
	Very little(1)	Little(2)	Moderate(3)	Great(4)	Very great(5)		
Less than 1 year	-	-	-	-	100.0	5.00	0.00
1-5 years	-	11.8	52.9	35.3	-	3.24	0.64
6-10 years	8.7	-	47.8	17.4	26.1	3.52	1.14
11-15 years	-	-	44.4	55.6	-	3.56	0.50
Over 15 years	-	-	33.3	66.7	-	3.67	0.47
Overall	**3.6**	**3.6**	**45.5**	**32.7**	**14.5**	**3.51**	**0.83**

Table 1 shows that overall, the threat of TT in the country was rated at a mean of 3.51 with a standard deviation of 0.83. All the few officers (100%) who had been in intelligence gathering and sharing (IG & S) for less than 1 year considered the threat as very great (mean = 5.00; Std. Dev. = 0.00). However, those who had served for over 15 years rated the threat at a mean of 3.67. Officers who had served for 11-15 years and 6-10 years rated the threat at a mean of 3.56 and 3.52 respectively. This indicates that the threat of TT is considered quite high at present. As reported by Njoku et al (2018), Kenya experienced 15 incidents of terror attacks in 2010, which increased to 70 by 2012. Nyongesa (2017) adds that between 2012 and 2015, terror attacks significantly increased further with change in targets which resulted to more devastating effects than before – for instance, the 2013 Westgate mall attack in Nairobi, the 2014 Mpeketoni attack in Lamu (Coast region) and the 2015 Garissa University attack in Garissa (North Eastern region. However, Njoku et al (2018) indicated that from 2016, the terrorist attacks in the country started to decrease. This implies thatcurrently, terror attacks are relatively lower than they were in the recent past.

However, the different respondents interviewed in this studymaintained that TT was still a major threat to the country. One of the senior security officers in Nairobi explained that

Transnational terrorism is a major threat to security as its effect can still be felt across important spheres such as the education sector where the youth opt for easy paying missions offered by terrorists as alternatives to studying.

This was seconded by a community leaderin Mandera who expressed that

...radicalized individuals have the mistaken notion that they would benefit by receiving military training and huge monetary donations from terrorist networks for their own welfare and that of their dependants.

Another senior security officer in Nairobi added that '*…being that they have critical targets like churches, malls, schools and other places of public interests which is very dangerous.*'

These assertions imply that the current perceived high threat of TT is mostly attributed to the current targets of terror attacks which make them to cause more devastating effects across diverse sectors than in the past.This means that the quantitative reduction in the number of terror attacks experienced at present as indicated by Njoku et al (2018) has not reduced the perceived threat of terrorism in the light of their targets.From the findings, it is therefore apparent that the persistent high threat posed by TT in the country is largely attributed to its effects that trickle across diverse significant sectors. This is worsened by the subjects targeted by the terrorists. It is no surprise the officers unanimously indicated that the fight against TT warrants the use of extralegal measures. A senior security officer in Mombasa expressed that it warrants the use of such measures '*….since the effect is very significant.*'Zabyelina (2009) recommends terrorism in general to be securitized mainly on the grounds of its major effect and threat. The implication therefore is that securitization of TT in Kenya is in order.

Effectiveness/Ineffectiveness of Various Counterterrorism Strategies

Globally, states have designed various measures to curb terrorism. These measures range from use of diplomatic powers, economic and financial power, information/intelligence, law enforcement and military power(Chumba, Okoth & Were, 2016). In Kenya, since the 9/11 bombing, the state has reinvigorated its efforts by implementing various counterterrorism strategies including: legislative reforms; bilateral and multilateral partnerships with other states including developed states like U.S and U.K; advanced training including training of special forces; institutional building among others (Mohochi, 2011). While each of these strategies have tremendous impact in curbing terrorism, respondents expressed diverse views on the effectiveness of the different counterterrorism strategies in the country.

Table 2: Perception on the effectiveness/ineffectiveness of counterterrorism strategies

Strategy	Very ineffective(1)	Ineffective(2)	Neutral(3)	Effective(4)	Very effective(5)	Mean	Std. Dev
Regional bodies (e.g IGAD)	11.5	9.6	44.2	28.8	5.8	3.08	1.04
Anti-terrorism laws and legislations	3.9	9.8	37.3	33.3	15.7	3.47	1.01
Use of special forces (e.g ATPU)	-	7.7	11.5	46.2	34.6	4.08	0.88
Intelligence gathering and sharing	3.7	-	11.1	44.4	40.7	4.19	0.91
Average						**3.70**	**0.96**

Table 2 indicates the officers' perception on the effectiveness and or ineffectiveness of different counterterrorism strategies being adopted in the country. The officers rated the overall effectiveness of counterterrorism strategies at a mean of 3.7 with a standard deviation of 0.96. This is an indication that overall, the counterterrorism strategies being used in the country are fairly effective. Use of IG & S had the highest mean of 4.19 with 40.7% of the respondents affirming it to be very effective. This implies that while different counterterrorism strategies have been adopted, IG & S stands out as the most effective in curbing TT.This could explain itswide adoption as part of counterterrorism efforts worldwide, as affirmed by scholars like McGill and Gray (2012). Use of special forces like ATPU wasalso highly rated at a mean of 4.08 with 34.6% rating it as very effective. Johansen (2015)attributes the effectiveness of special forces to their high level training and skills which is critical in curbing terrorism.On anti-terrorism laws and legislations, most of the respondents (37.3%) were neutral on its effectivenesswhich explains its overall mean rating of 3.47. This implies that anti-terrorism legislation in the country is yet to be streamlined to effectiveness. This concurs with earlier observations by Mohochi (2011) who indicated that Kenya was yet to establish specific effective counterterrorism legislation despite the legislation reforms undertaken. Similarly, most of them (44.2%) were alsoneutral on the effectiveness of regional bodies (like IGAD)which also reflected in the overall mean rating of 3.08. This means that regional bodies to which Kenya is an affiliate are yet to yield sufficient positive results in curbing terrorism. Thisaffirms the findings byFulgence (2015) who revealed that regional bodies like IGAD are yet accomplish the anticipated common goal of curbing terrorism. This according to Ansaaku (2017) is due to limited cooperation between member states in these regional bodies. Fulgence (2015) blames the lack of cooperation on competing national interests and the urge to safeguard national sovereignty which often makes the intervention of one state in another difficult or cause major negative effects on the specific country that invades the other in the fight against terrorism. As a result, Fulgence (2015) explains that how the individual members define and value terrorism is different and consequently, cooperation in these regional bodies in the fight against terrorism is just theoretical. The implication is thatwhenever two or more states come together as one body and agree to confront terrorism as a common enemy, they are bound to fail as long as theirresolve to curb terrorism does not supersede their individual national interests.

IV. DISCUSSION

The findings indicate that the security officers in the country perceive terrorism as unlawful acts intended to accomplish social, political or economic goals and which involve violence with the major aim of intimidating the civilians. This conceptualization captures the two critical components that Sandler (2015) identified as the elements that define terrorism which include: aspect of violence and that of a social/political motive. The violence according to Sandler (2015) entails shocking violent acts of such a nature that intimidates the public. However, the findings also imply that the officers acknowledge that what they may consider as terrorism may be considered differently in another context. This reflects what was asserted by Alex (2004) that the conceptualization of "terrorism" is likely to remain subjective to the interest of a particular state. Alex (2004) elaborated that one who is defined as a 'terrorist' in one state may be considered a 'freedom fighter' in another state. The implication therefore is that, as long as there is no universal legal definition jointly 'approved' by an international body such as the United Nations, definition of terrorism is likely to remain contested due to lack of any legal backing. Most of what individual states or agencies define as terrorism remains non-binding and lacks legal authority under the international law. It is no surprise then that in the fight against terrorism, some 'loyalists' at times defect to the 'terrorists' in the game. For instance, Manuel Noriega of Panama, Saddam

Hussein, and Osama Bin Laden (the 9/11 mastermind) were at one time strategic allies of the U.S (Chehade, 2007).

The findings imply that transnational terrorism receives major boost from transnational crimes to further their activities. This means transnational terrorism in its broad system is connected to transnational crime. Therefore in analyzing transnational terrorism with a view to defeat it, elements of transaction crime should be factored. A similar concern was highlighted by the United States DNI that the increasing linkage between transnational crimes and transnational terrorism should be considered among the U.S major contemporary national security threats. They argued that terrorists will often commit other crimes and work with transnational organized criminal groups especially to acquire financing and logistical support (Alda& Sala, 2014). The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) also highlighted that the networks between transnational crimes and terrorism is responsible for the security crisis in the Sahel region (UNODC, 2013).

This study shows that religious ideologies are both a motive behind TT as well as a scheme which terrorists may lean on to execute attacks in the country. This implies that religious ideology is a major channel that is used to propagate transnational terrorism. This may be attributed to what Aronson (2013) terns as an overwhelming belief in large segments of both the society and the government that Muslims in the country are responsible for the terror attacks that have been experienced in the country. These findings however need to be carefully interpreted. It does not mean that because individuals have such beliefs, transnational terrorism should be squarely blamed on religion. Muslims who have often been associated with terrorism are not necessarily like the populous belief portrays sinceit has also been asserted that the large Muslim majority are not into terrorism (Githens-Mazer, 2008). Other factors as revealed in this study including economic factors like youth unemployment as well as other social factors like media influence need careful attention.

The findings also make it apparent that the threat of TT still remains relatively high in the country. This current high level of the threat of TT is especially anchored on the terrorists' style of largely recruiting the youth into the terror activities and their targeting of critical public places during attacks both of which causes major negative effects on different sectors of the economy. This supports the findings by Kiarie and Mogambi (2017) that indicated that transnational terrorism still stands as a major security threat in the country. Due to this perception of the high threat of TT and its effect, the study confirmed that officers sometimes use extralegal measures in the fight against TT. This implies that terrorism has been securitized in the country which is in line with the Securitization theory that requires that an issue must fulfill two distinguishing requirements for its securitization: it should first proof to be an existing threat and then, it should be such a threat that invokes the use of extraordinary/extralegal measures (Buzan et al., 1998).

This implies that the most effective counter-terrorism strategies in the country include the use of IG & S and the use of special forces respectively. This could explain why IG & S has been in the lead on the strategies adopted in the war on terror in most countries (Lowenthal, 2016). The effectiveness of Special Forces is largely attributed to their high level training and skills in applying unconventional and unorthodox techniques often unexpected by their enemies, which enable them to apply force with extreme precision against the enemy's critical vulnerabilities (Johansen, 2015). This could explain the deployment of special forces during recent terror attacks in the country. For instance, during the Garissa University attack in April 2015, the deployment of Special Forces (the Recce squad) to the scene of the attack ended the day long siege in less than thirty minutes, with their late deployment bringing huge criticism to security leadership in the country (Mukinda, 2015). The late deployment was highly blamed for the massive casualties that resulted from the attack. In a more recent attack in the Dusit D$_2$ complex in Nairobi on 15th January 2019, a more swift response from multi-agencies in which the Special Forces were deployed shortly after the attack helped to neutralize the terrorists and end the siege within a short time and with relatively few casualties (Ombati, 2019).

V. CONCLUSIONS

The study concludes that the conceptualization of terrorism has continued to vary over time with changes in motives and targets of the terrorists in their attacks. Presently, conceptualization of terrorism/terrorist is biased and subject to individual states and different individuals in the state. The war against terror is therefore not a fight against a common enemy per se as construed by most states especially in their bilateral and multilateral alliances. The study further concludes that there has been a major paradigm shift in motives and factors perceived to drive people to engage in terrorism. While traditionally it was mostly associated with the poor in the society, the motives for engaging in terrorism today are different including religious motives and pursuit for economic gains especially by the youth. Social factors including media influence and the peer pressure are currently playing a major role in perpetrating TT.While religion is perceived as playing a great role,individual's allegiance to a given religious faith shouldnot be considered as sufficient ground to treat them as terror suspects. The fact that one's belief is rooted in a given religion is not synonymous to their engagement in terrorism. Security agents should objectively dig deeper into other explanations such as elements of radicalization both inside and outside the substance of the belief they hold onto.It is further inferred that the

current threat of TT has continuously increased overtime with increase in number of attacks since the 1970s. Although there has been a reduction in the number of terrorist attacks presently compared to the attacks between 2010 and 2015, the threat of TT is still high in the country is still high. However, the high threat is in terms of the critical targets of terror attacks at present which still makes it possible even for a single attack to cause devastating effects across diverse sectors of the economy. Lastly, the study concludes that IG & S and use of special forces as counterterrorism measures are currently the mosteffectivein curbing TT. However,theyneed to be supplementedby enhancing other counterterrorism strategies including streamlining the anti-terrorism legislation in the country and enhancing cooperation between member states in regional bodies.

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